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and what effects they will have on consumers and others. Does a con-
tract increase prices? Create wealth? Both? Economic theory can 
help judges answer these and other questions. It is little wonder, 
then, that implicitly or explicitly, economics has played an important 
role in the development of antitrust doctrine since Congress passed 
the Sherman Act over a century ago.1 
Economics, however, is not a static science. Contracts that once 
seemed to harm consumers, for instance, may now appear innocuous 
or even beneficial. Yet the mere fact that the economist's evaluation 
of a practice has changed radically does not necessarily require a con-
comitant change in antitrust doctrine. While economic theory can 
perform a descriptive function, explaining what purposes or effects 
various contracts might have, economics cannot tell judges what pur-
poses or effects matter under the antitrust laws.2 That question, in-
stead, is a purely normative one that courts must answer by invoking 
their best reading of these statutes. Moreover, economic theory does 
not limit the range of answers to this normative question. Contracts 
that economists view with indifference or approval can have social or 
political consequences that Congress may have meant to remedy 
through antitrust regulation-even, perhaps, at the expense of con-
sumers or efficiency. To be sure, economics can help courts illumi-
nate the nature and extent of the trade off between, for example, the 
deconcentration of economic power and lower prices. Economics 
cannot, however, determine whether this much deconcentration is 
worth that much consumer welfare or whether such a trade off is ap-
propriate in the first place. 
While the boundaries between the descriptive and the normative 
are theoretically clear, courts do not always respect them in practice. 
One such instance of failure to respect those boundaries prompts this 
essay: the Supreme Court's recent opinion in State Oil Co. v. Khan.3 In 
Khan, the Court reconsidered its decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,4 
which had declared maximum resale price maintenance ("maximum 
rpm") per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.5 Relying upon ad-
vances in economic theory which suggested that maximum rpm likely 
I See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw, 1836-1937, at 268 (1991) 
("Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); MichaelS. 
Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 226 
(1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic 
models to explain or modifY the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement."). 
2 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYS IN PosiTIVE 
EcoNOMICS 3, 3-7 (1953). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 
78 CAL. L. REv. 815 (1990) (contending that welfare economics cannot dictate legal results 
without additional normative arguments). 
3 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997). 
4 390 u.s. 145 (1968). 
5 See id. at 151-54. 
1999] INCOHERENCE IN ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 765 
may enhance the welfare of consumers, the Khan Court asserted that 
Alhrecht rested upon economic premises that have been discredited. 6 
As shown below, Khan's repudiation of Alhrecht cannot be justified 
as a ministerial application of economic theory. Alhrecht did not de-
pend upon any particular account of the purely economic effects of 
maximum rpm. Instead, the decision was based upon a conclusion 
that the practice interfered with the discretion of dealers to price as 
they saw fit and thus offended "trader freedom," a value the Court 
long had held worthy of protection under the antitrust laws. Khan's 
determination that maximum rpm is more beneficial than Alhrecht 
might have supposed further highlights the trade off between the pro-
tection of dealers and the welfare of consumers; however, it does not 
ipso facto establish that Alhrechtwas wrongly decided. Rather, Khan im-
plicitly rests upon the repudiation of Alhrechfs normative vision of an-
titrust and the substitution of an alternative vision that sees no 
independent role for "trader freedom" in the development of anti-
trust doctrine. 
Khan's failure to address squarely the normative basis for its con-
sumer-friendly decision is nothing new. For over two decades, the 
Supreme Court fastidiously has declined to articulate a vision of what 
the antitrust laws were designed to accomplish, all the while develop-
ing a jurisprudence that is increasingly solicitous of consumers and 
indifferent to trader freedom. In so doing, the Court has narrowed or 
overruled precedents that, like Albrecht, have rested upon 
noneconomic values such as trader freedom. It has not, however, ex-
plicitly questioned the normative basis for these prior decisions, but 
instead has employed revised economic theory to discredit them. In-
deed in some instances, the Court actually has left intact certain deci-
sions that rest on trader freedom, albeit in narrowed form. 
Supporters and opponents alike may see Khan as one more step 
in an inexorable and silent march toward an antitrust jurisprudence 
that rests solely upon the welfare of consumers. More cynical observ-
ers may even see a disingenuous use of economic theory to shield a 
less-than-candid abandonment of trader freedom, a value deeply en-
trenched in several decades of case law. Closer analysis, however, 
reveals a different account of the Court's behavior and the role of 
economic theory in its decision making. One can characterize Khan, 
as well as the Court's approach to trader freedom generally, as an at-
tempt to minimize the institutional costs associated with the appear-
ance of politicized decision making in an environment in which the 
normative foundations of antitrust are in serious dispute. Advances in 
economic theory have made it clear that the protection of traders 
6 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284-85. 
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often occurs at the expense of consumers. As a result, adherence to 
decisions such as Albrecht would have required the Court to balance 
the welfare of consumers against the social, moral, and political bene-
fits of trader freedom. Because there is no consensus that Congress 
meant for courts to trade off consumer welfare against other values, 
the pursuit of such balancing would appear incompatible with the ju-
dicial function. Thus, by repudiating Albrecht the Court avoided the 
appearance of politicized decision making and safeguarded its own 
legitimacy. Further, by characterizing its repudiation as an applica-
tion of changed economic theory, the Court avoided a direct chal-
lenge to Albrechfs normative vision and the accompanying costs of 
questioning an approach to antitrust policy with significant preceden-
tial support. 
This account of the Khan Court's behavior explains its reticence 
to excise explicitly trader freedom from antitrust jurisprudence and 
suggests that-at least in the short run-this value will continue to 
play some role in antitrust doctrine. After all, not all trader freedom 
precedents involve clear sacrifices in consumer welfare, even when 
one takes advances in economic theory into account. Adherence to 
such decisions, therefore, does not always entail the appearance of 
political decision making of the sort that would have attended adher-
ence to Albrecht, some doctrines can protect traders without (appar-
ently) harming consumers. Repudiation of such decisions, then, 
could not rest upon changes in economic theory but instead would 
entail the high cost of questioning directly the normative premises of 
the trader freedom era. Ironically, the Court's fastidious attention to 
the appearance of principled decision making has produced an inco-
herent antitrust doctrine. Still, absent a new consensus regarding the 
normative foundations of antitrust, the Court's equivocal approach to 
trader freedom likely will continue. 
I 
TRADER FREEDOM's UNCERTAIN STATUS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
For decades the Supreme Court looked outside economic theory 
for the normative content of antitrust. In particular, the Court con-
sistently held that "trader freedom"-the autonomy of individuals and 
small businesses-deserved independent significance under the anti-
trust laws. Group boycotts were deemed per se unlawful, even absent 
any showing of anticompetitive effect, because they interfered with 
the freedom of firms to compete in the marketplace. 7 Horizontal ter-
7 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959); Fashion 
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. ITC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941). 
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ritorial restraints ancillary to otherwise lawful joint ventures were un-
lawful because they limited the discretion of traders to determine 
where they would operate. 8 Tying contracts, which bound purchasers 
to take one product in order to obtain another, were condemned be-
cause they deprived purchasers of the freedom to do business with the 
vendor of their choice and denied vendors the correlative opportunity 
to sel1.9 Horizontal maximum price fixing-agreements that reduced 
prices-were banned because they deprived parties to them of the 
freedom to price as they saw fit. 10 Mergers-even those that might 
lead to lower prices-were viewed with hostility because they elimi-
nated independent competitors and threatened to drive smaller, less 
efficient firms out of business.H Congress, the Justices claimed, ex-
pressly had mandated the protection of trader freedom, even when 
that protection came at the expense of consumers.12 Scholars during 
this era generally agreed with this assessment of the law's scope.l3 
8 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). In Topco the Court 
noted: 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of eco-
nomic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaran-
teed each and euery business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete . . . . 
Id. at 610 (emphasis added). 
9 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 497-98, 503-04 
(1969); HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANrrrRusr PoLICY: THE LAw OF CoMPETITION AND 
ITs PRACTICE§ 10.1, at 352 (1994) (concluding that the "main focus" of tying doctrine has 
been "on interference with the freedom of dealers or other purchasers to make individual 
business judgments"); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to 
the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12-21 (1997); seealsoFI'Cv. Brown Shoe Co., 384 
U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (voiding exclusive dealing contract because it "take[s] away freedom 
of purchasers to buy in an open market" and thus offends "the central policy" of the anti-
trust laws). 
10 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 
(1951). 
11 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966) (declaring a 
merger in an unconcentrated market unlawful); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 344 (1962) (opining that efficiencies that may lead to lower prices also could militate 
against a merger). 
12 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212; Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 
U.S. at 467. Judge Learned Hand's articulation of the Sherman Act's purported concern 
for trader freedom is typical: 
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monop-
oly; but . . . there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial 
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic re-
sults. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself ... showed that 
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before 
them. 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945). 
13 See, e.g., EAru. W. KINTNER, AN ANrrrRusr PRIMER at xiii-xiv (1964); LAwRENCE 
ANTHoNY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK oF THE LAw oF ANTrrRusr 10-13 (1977); Harlan M. Blake & 
William K Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 377, 383-84 (1965). There were, 
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The Court did not ignore economic theory in developing its anti-
trust jurisprudence during this trader freedom era. To the contrary, 
the Court's opinions almost always contained assertions about the eco-
nomic effects of the practices in question.l4 These assertions, never-
theless, usually appeared side-by-side with language regarding the 
practices' impact on trader freedom, language that often appeared 
dispositive.15 Economics served a makeweight function, allowing the 
Court to assert that its decisions, while enhancing the freedom of trad-
ers, also promoted the welfare of consumers.16 Indeed, to the extent 
that the Court was able to portray its decisions as favorable to consum-
ers, it minimized the appearance of preferring traders to consumers, 
thus implying that little turned on the conclusion that trader freedom 
was of independent significanceP 
Perhaps no decision better exemplifies the Court's solicitude for 
trader freedom than Albrecht v. Herald Co.18 In Albrecht, the Court de-
termined that agreements setting maximum resale prices were unlaw-
ful per se because, among other things, they interfered with the 
discretion of dealers to price their products as they saw fit.19 The ex-
ercise of this discretion, of course, could readily raise prices, to the 
detriment of consumers. Thus, while the Court also invoked certain 
economic evils that such contracts "might" produce, the categorical 
ban on maximum rpm reflected a normative conception of antitrust 
willing to subordinate the interests of consumers to those of dealers. 
it should be noted, significant dissents from this view within the academy. See, e.g., Robert 
H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 363, 369-70 
(1965). However, even the dissenters conceded that "most commentators on the topic" 
agreed that antitrust had a social purpose that could override the welfare of consumers. /d. 
at 369. 
14 See HoVENKAMP, supra note 9, § 2.2a, at 61 ("Even the relative aggressiveness of the 
Warren Court era was grounded in economic theory, although antitrusters often pushed 
the theory too far."). 
15 See, e.g., Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 274-78 (voiding a merger that eliminated small 
competitors and purportedly threatened a "trend toward concentration"); Klw's, 359 U.S. 
at 213 (condemning group boycotts because they interfered with trader freedom and led 
to "monopoly"). 
16 See Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Popu-
lism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 330 (1968) (suggesting that the Court "used eco-
nomic doctrine to support decisioo.s arrived at upon other grounds"); id. at 332 (arguing 
that the Court was primarily concerned with "equality of opportunity, free access to mar-
kets by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers"); Frederick M. 
Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Econom-
ics, 72 GEO. LJ. 1511, 1524-27 (1984) (arguing that during the 1960s the Court employed 
economic theory to justify decisions motivated by political and social concerns). 
17 See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, Ideo"UJgical Cycles and Unstable Antitrust 
Rules, 31 ANrrrRusr BuLL. 323, 330 (1986) (contending that during the trader freedom era 
"[t]he precise objective of antitrust policy was unimportant, for populist and economic 
approaches yielded consistent results"). 
18 390 u.s. 145 (1968). 
19 See id. at 152-53. 
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Things changed, some thought, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc.20 In Sylvania, the Court reconsidered the per se ban on 
agreements granting exclusive territories that it had announced just a 
decade earlier in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.2I Relying upon 
"new economics" regarding the virtues of such agreements, the Court 
determined that Schwinn's per se rule lacked justification and that such 
agreements should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the 
"Rule of Reason."22 To the chagrin of some, however, the Court pro-
vided "virtually no guidance" on how to conduct the Rule of Reason 
analysis.23 
In a footnote, the Sylvania Court explicitly njected the assertion 
that concerns for dealer autonomy justified adherence to Schwinn's per 
se rule. 24 Schwinn, it claimed, did not purport to rest upon trader free-
dom, but instead upon the economic consequences of exclusive terri-
tories. 25 Although the Court could have stopped there, it went on to 
repudiate several decades of its stated antitrust policy, opining that 
trader freedom should play no role in the development of antitrust 
doctrine. 26 The Court neither mentioned nor explicitly questioned 
assertions in prior case law that one purpose of antitrust law was to 
protect this autonomy. Nor did the Court claim that economic theory 
itself justified the abandonment of trader freedom. Instead, it ob-
served that an antitrust policy concerned with this value, and not 
"market considerations," would "lack any objective benchmarks."27 
Scholars naturally have disagreed over the exact meaning of Sylr 
vania's dictum for the normative content of antitrust. Some have ar-
gued that the decision signalled a wholesale abandonment of trader 
freedom as a valid antitrust consideration and a substitution of an an-
titrust policy that rests solely upon solicitude for consumers. 28 Others 
20 433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
21 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
22 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59. 
23 Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 
78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1978). 
24 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21; see also id. at 67-70 (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that the majority "summarily reject[ed] th[e] concern ... for the au-
tonomy of independent businessmen" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
25 See id. at 53 n.21. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 888 
(1981) ("The Supreme Court has overruled Schwinn and explicitly rejected any analysis 
that makes antitrust cases tum on the 'autonomy of independent businessmen.' Argu-
ments about the effect of a practice on quantity and price, not arguments about freedom 
and autonomy, control antitrust analysis." (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21) ); Richard 
A Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977) ("One must not read a Supreme Court opinion like a bond 
indenture, but it does appear that the Court is implying that antitrust prohibitions must 
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have suggested that the Court meant this language to apply only to 
the narrow question before it: whether exclusive territories should be 
unlawful per se. 29 According to these commentators, trader freedom 
did not justify per se treatment in light of the newly discovered benefits 
of such agreements; still, they said, it should play a role in analyzing 
these restraints under the Rule of Reason.30 
These contending positions reflected emerging disagreements 
between two opposing schools of antitrust thought regarding the nor-
mative premises that should inform antitrust doctrine. 31 The "Popu-
list" or "trader freedom" school embraces the traditional idea that an 
important, perhaps central goal of antitrust doctrine is the enhance-
ment of trader freedom, even if such enhancement occasionally oc-
curs at the expense of consumers.32 The "consumer welfare" school, 
on the other hand, holds that one should judge restraints solely ac-
cording to their effect on consumers.33 Although members of this 
school disagree about how to define "consumer welfare," there is a 
have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of smallness ... will not be 
permitted to decide antitrust cases."). Similarly, without citing this dictum, Robert Bork 
asserted that Sylvania implicitly rejected dealer freedom. See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Re-
straints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 171, 172 ("A great deal of doctrinal baggage 
about the social purposes of these laws ... was silently jettisoned."). 
29 See, e.g., William B. Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrat-
ing Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461, 495-96 (1979) (argu-
ing that "the Court [did not] intimate that [trader freedom] should be kept from 
consideration, or that economic efficiencies should become the sole determinant"); John 
J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 1095, ll01 (1986) ("Justice Powell's statement [in footnote 21 
of Sylvania] hardly represents a resounding rejection of injecting social and economic val-
ues and broader economic goals into the interpretation of antitrust concepts .... "). 
30 See Bohling, supra note 29, at 497-503; Flynn, supra note 29, at ll01-02; see also 
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 1140, 
ll76-85 (1981) (accepting Sylvania but contending that trader freedom should still play a 
role in vertical restraints doctrine). 
31 See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAw 3-ll (1993) (comparing and 
contrasting normative approaches of the "Chicago" and "Populist" schools);Jacobs, supra 
note I, at 226-40 (same). 
32 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the Social "Science" of Eco-
nomics, 33 ANTITRUST BuLL. 713, 719-20 (1988); Fox, supra note 30, at ll52-55; Robert 
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1060-65 (1979) (arguing 
that concerns regarding concentration of power motivated Congress when it amended § 7 
of the Clayton Act); see also supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (collecting sources 
enunciating trader freedom approach). 
33 See, e.g., 1 PHILUP AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw~~ 100-13 (rev. 
ed. 1997); RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRuST PARADox 107-15 (1978); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust La:w?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 715 (1982); Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpre-
tation (:hallenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982). 
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clear consensus that "trader freedom" should play no role in the de-
velopment of antitrust doctrine. 34 
In the two decades since Sylvania, the Court has avoided further 
articulation of its normative vision for antitrust law and thus has re-
fused to explain whether trader freedom continues to be a worthy 
consideration in the evolution of antitrust doctrine. To be sure, the 
Court has de-emphasized trader freedom in several settings, often nar-
rowing the scope of decisions grounded upon this value.35 Unlike the 
Sylvania Court, however, the Court has declined to explain its own 
normative premises or to criticize those of its predecessors. Instead 
the Court has rested its decisions upon advances in economic theory 
that purportedly call its prior decisions into question.36 
Although the Court has narrowed doctrines that were premised 
on concern for trader freedom, it has refused to discard them alto-
gether. 37 Tying law provides a ready example. Influenced by ad-
vances in economic thinking, the Court has made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to establish that a seller has "forced" a tie on a purchaser. 
Specifically, the Court has required a plaintiff to prove that the seller 
actually possesses market power before it can establish that forcing has 
occurred. 38 Still, the Court continues to adhere to the view that with-
out more, this forcing gives rise to per se liability, despite the general 
34 Compare Lande, supra note 33 (equating consumer welfare with competitive pric-
ing), with BoRK, supra note 33, at 107-15 (defining "consumer welfare" as the aggregate 
wealth of society). 
35 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
221-27 (1993) (narrowing the definition of "competitive injury" under the Robinson-Pat:-
man Act); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-31, 735-36 (1988) 
(narrowing the definition of minimum rpm); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-98 (1986) (heightening standards. governing proof of predatory 
pricing); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 296-98 (1985) (confining per se rule against group boycotts to cases in which either (I) 
the defendant possesses market power or (2) the boycott is not ancillary to an otherwise 
legitimate joint venture). 
36 See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223-30 (relying upon revised thinking regarding 
the feasibility of predation to narrow definition of "competitive injury" under Robinson-
Patman Act); Sharp, 485 U.S. at 725-28 (relying upon new understandings of the benefits of 
vertical restraints to contract definition of minimum rpm); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-93 
(relying upon literature concluding that predation is rare to heighten summary judgment 
standards in cases alleging a predatory pricing conspiracy); see also William H. Page, Legal 
Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY LJ. 1, 47-69 (1995) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has adjusted Warren-era doctrine in light of revised economic models). 
37 See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, 
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221, 1237-38, 1253-57 (1989) 
(arguing that the Court has refused fully to embrace consumer welfare as the exclusive 
goal of antitrust); Page, supra note 36, at 47-53. 
38 See jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984); cf., e.g., 
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 & n.4·(I962) (holding that, without more, 
possession of a copyright confers "economic power" of the sort necessary to establish per se 
liability). For a discussion of the evolution of the market power requirement in the tying 
context, see Meese, supra note 9, at 18-21; Page, supra note 36, at 63-65. 
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consensus that tying contracts are often innocuous or beneficial.39 
"While this position has led some scholars to criticize current doctrine 
as incoherent, it flows naturally from a solicitude for the "freedom" of 
traders and other purchasers.40 
Other examples illustrate the Court's reluctance to wholly discard 
considerations of trader freedom. For instance, the Court has nar-
rowed the class of conduct deemed minimum rpm and has made it 
more difficult for dealers alleging such conduct to survive summary 
judgment.41 At the same time, however, the Court has retained the 
per se rule against minimum rpm agreements, a position that many 
attribute to a regard for trader freedom. 42 Moreover, the Court has 
continued to adhere to the per se rule against horizontal maximum 
price fixing, even though such contracts can reduce consumer 
prices. 43 It is little wonder that long after Sylvania, lower courts and 
39 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-15; cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462-69 (1992) (reaffirming the per se rule); Jefferson Parish, 466 
U.S. at 41-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that tying contracts should be lawful 
absent proof of anticompetitive effect); BoRK, supra note 33, at 372-81 (concluding that 
tying contracts are rarely harmful). 
40 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Shennan 
Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 263, 311 (1986) (referring to Jefferson Parish as "a Jekyll and Hyde" 
opinion, in which "tlvo ... antitrust personalities struggle for dominance"); Diane Wood 
Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 69, 134-35 
(arguing that the m<9ority opinion in Jefferson Parish was internally inconsistent and wanted 
to "have things both ways"). 
41 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-31, 735-36 (1988); 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-64 (1984); see also Barbara Ann 
White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical JW. 
straints Regulation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, passim (1991) (reviewing the Court's recent 
vertical restraints jurisprudence and arguing that it has created a regime of per se legality 
with respect to certain vertical price restraints). 
42 See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 735-36; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7 (refusing to reconsider 
per se rule against minimum rpm, ostensibly because the lower courts had not addressed 
the question); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.l8 (1977) 
(stating that its holding did not undermine the per se rule against minimum rpm); see also 
id. at 67 (White,]., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the ban on minimum rpm rests 
upon concern for the freedom of traders); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (Posner, CJ.) (opining that the Court's continuing hostility toward minimum 
rpm must rest upon something other than a concern for consumer welfare); Flynn, supra 
note 29, at 1144 ("[Resale price maintenance] impairs a central goal of antitrust policy-
the independence of traders to set their own price .... "); Fox, supra note 30, at 1184 
("The per se rule against vertical price-fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should 
have the freedom to charge the price they see fit .... "). 
43 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982); Peter M. 
Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of The Chicago Schoo~ 
1982 SuP. CT. REv. 319,344-48 (contending that the Maricopa County decision rests upon a 
rejection of consumer welfare as the sole normative value in antitrust); Louis Kaplow, Anti-
trust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1987, at 181, 205 
(same). 
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scholars disagree in their assessment of the Court's attitude toward 
trader freedom.44 
In Khan, the Court had a unique opportunity to clarify the role, if 
any, that trader freedom should play in antitrust policy. The Khan 
Court reconsidered its holding in Albrecht, which had declared maxi-
mum rpm-a practice that reduces consumer prices-unlawful per se. 
Because the Albrecht Court explicitly rested its decision upon solici-
tude for trader freedom, economic theory alone, it seemed, could not 
justify repudiating the decision, even if the theory demonstrated that 
Albrecht's rule harmed consumers. Rejection of Albrecht seemingly 
would require an explicit renunciation of "trader freedom," while ad-
herence would require its reaffirmation. 
As many had hoped, 45 the Court overruled Albrecht in Khan. 46 It 
did so, however, without indicating whether trader freedom does and 
should continue to play a role in antitrust law. Instead, without ques-
tioning Albrecht's commitment to this value, the Court claimed that 
advances in economic theory required it to overturn Albrecht. 47 As 
shown below, however, the Court's reasoning proved unconvincing, 
leading one to suspect that Khan involved more than simply the minis-
terial application of economic theory and to wonder just what role 
trader freedom will play in future decisions. 
II 
EcoNOMic THEORY AND TRADER FREEDOM: A 
RoCKY RElATIONSHIP 
A. Economic Theory as Figleaf: Price Theory and Albrechfs 
Protection of Traders 
On its face, Albrecht presented an almost paradigmatic conflict be-
tween trader freedom and consumers. The facts were straightfor-
44 Compare Fishman v. Estate ofWutz, 807 F.2d 520, 566-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easter-
brook,]., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent reflects sin-
gular concern for consumer welfare), and Ross, supra note 31, at 3 ("The now ascendant 
view· is that antitrust laws should promote allocative efficiency."), with Rothery Storage v. 
Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald,J., concurring) (arguing that 
precedent reflects concern for noneconomic values), HoVENKAMP, supra note 9, § 2.2e, at 
69 (arguing that current law does not uniformly reflect concern for economic efficiency), 
and Page, supra note 36, at 47-69 (same). 
45 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale 
Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1007, 1032 (1991); see also 
Khan, 93 F.3d at 1363 (Posner, CJ.) ("Albrecht was unsound when decided, and is inconsis-
tent with later decisions by the Supreme Court. It should be overruled. Someday, we ex-
pect, it will be."). 
46 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284-85. 
47 See id. at 283 ("After reconsidering Albrecht's rationale ... we conclude that there is 
insufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price 
fixing."). 
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ward. 48 The Herald Company published a rooming paper in St. 
Louis, the Globe-Democrat. Herald appointed Albrecht as a Globe dis-
tributor, subject to Herald's written policy setting a ceiling on resale 
prices.49 Albrecht, however, insisted on charging a price higher than 
that which Herald had set and had advertised to the public. Herald 
engaged in self-help, delivering papers to Albrecht's customers at the 
advertised prices. Albrecht then relented, lowering his prices before 
eventually selling the route to another entrepreneur. 
The Court found that Herald's maintenance of maximum resale 
prices was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.50 To the casual 
reader, the Court's decision may have appeared to rest upon concem 
for consumers and efficiency, as the Court offered three ways in which 
maximum rpm agreements could have negative economic conse-
quences. Such agreements, the Court said, could set prices so low as 
to prevent small dealers from providing essential services to consum-
ers. 51 Moreover, by setting prices below the costs that some dealers 
faced, maximum rpm agreements could "channel distribution 
through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers."52 Finally, the 
Court suggested that a purportedly maximum resale price in fact 
tends to become a minimum. 53 
The Court's eagemess to ascribe deleterious consequences to 
such agreements flowed naturally from the state of economic science 
at the time. Price theory, the then-dominant economic paradigm, 
treated the boundaries of the firm as a given, determined by technol-
ogy.54 The only transactions contemplated by this paradigm involved 
the sale of an item from one firm to another with no accompanying 
contractual restrictions.55 Moreover, this paradigm recognized only 
those efficiencies that could be achieved within a firm, such as econo-
mies of scale or superior management. 56 The price-theory paradigm 
48 Unless othenvise noted, the facts are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion. See 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 144, 147-49 (1968). 
49 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 1966). 
50 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. at 153. 
53 See id. 
54 See RH. CoASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in THE FIRM, THE MAR-
KET, AND THE LAw 57, 60-67 (1988); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS oF 
CAPITALISM 7 (1985); George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the 
Market, 59 J. PoL. EcoN. 185, 185 (1951) (stating that econmnists "have generally treated as 
a {technological?) datum the problem of what the firm does-what governs its range of 
activities or functions"). 
55 See Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition and Efficiency, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 
831, 835 (1989). 
56 See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. LJ. 271, 272 (1987). For ex-
amples of this outlook, see DoNALD DE\VEY, MoNOPOLY IN EcoNOMICS AND LAw 201-02 
(1959); Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 
69 YALE LJ. 1, 2-3 {1959). 
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gave rise, in tum, to the "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust. 57 Within 
this milieu, it was difficult to characterize maximum rpm agreements 
as reflecting any cooperative effort between manufacturer and dealer 
to improve customer service. Instead, scholars characterized vertical 
restraints, and other nonstandard contracts that influenced dealers' 
decisions after passage of title, as unnatural, "coercive" efforts to ex-
tend the "power" of a manufacturer beyond its normal boundaries to 
the detriment of dealers and consumers. 5 8 The Albrecht Court's asser-
tion that, for instance, manufacturers might employ maximum rpm to 
drive prices below dealer costs-even if this strategy harmed consum-
ers-fits comfortably within this tradition. 
Even on its own terms, however, the Albrecht_ Court's analysis of 
the economic consequences of maximum rpm did not warrant per se 
treatment. To begin with, the fear that maximum rpm would channel 
distribution through larger, more efficient dealers did not derive from 
regard for consumer welfare, but instead a desire to protect smaller, 
less efficient producers. Moreover, even if the Court's concems could 
be deemed "economic," they still did not justify per se treatment of 
maximum rpm agreements. Previously, the Court had reserved such 
treatment for only those agreements that, by their nature, had a "per-
nicious effect on competition."59 The Albrecht Court, however, did not 
assert that maximum rpm "always" or "almost always" had the "perni-
cious" economic effects it identified. 60 Instead, the Court simply 
57 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1984) 
(describing the inhospitality tradition); Williamson, supra note 56, at 272-73 & n.6. The 
phrase "inhospitality tradition" apparently was coined by Professor Donald Turner, who 
said: "I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law 
tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, Some Reflec-
tions on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. .ANTITRusr L. SYMP. 1, 1-2. 
58 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 54, at 371 ("[S]ince there is nothing to be gained by 
introducing nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange, the use of contract re-
straints was presumed to have anticompetitive purpose and affect [sic]."); Alan]. Meese, 
Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 176-83 
(1997); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HAsrrNcs LJ. 511, 
538-41 (1989) (concluding that Albrecht was based upon a desire to "redistribute bargaining 
power between large producers and small distributors"). The remarks of one commenta-
tor, who approved of Albrecht, capture nicely the attitude of the time. See Jerrold G. Van 
Cise, Franchising-From Power to Partnership, 15 ANTITRusr BuLL. 443, 443 (1970) (analogiz-
ing a franchisor to a "medieval feudal lord holding the power of economic life and death 
over enfranchised serfs"). Some commentators continue to characterize vertical restraints 
in this manner. See, e.g., John]. Flynn &James F. Ponsoldt, LegalRea.5oning and the jurispru-
dence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Ana~sis in the Resolution of 
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1149 & n.91 (1987) (arguing that the agreement 
in Albrecht resulted from unequal bargaining power). 
59 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
60 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (hold-
ing that the per se rule should be applied only to a practice that "facially appears to be one 
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" (cit-
ing Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4)). 
776 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:763 
stated that each of these effects "may" occur.61 However, it did invoke 
one effect that these agreements always had: a limitation on the "free-
dom" of dealers to price as they saw fit.62 Indeed, as a logical matter, 
the absence of any assertion that maximum rpm "certainly" or even 
"probably" produced negative economic effects indicates that this lim-
itation on trader freedom-not any purported anticompetitive ef-
fects-led the Albrecht Court to declare these restraints unlawful. 63 In 
fact, in his concurrence in Sylvania, Justice White, the author of Al-
brecht, admitted as much, citing Albrecht as one of several decisions pre-
mised upon "concern for the freedom of the businessman to dispose 
of his own goods as he sees fit. "64 By invoking the specter of more 
concrete anticompetitive consequences, the Albrecht Court managed 
to mask any appearance that it was protecting dealers at the expense 
of consumers. Economic theory, such as it was, served as a convenient 
fig leaf, donned by a Court unwilling to admit it was giving "trader 
freedom" dispositive effect. 65 
61 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53. 
62 "[A]greements to fix maximum prices 'no less than those to fix minimum prices, 
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with 
their own judgment.'" Id. at 152 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) ). 
63 One leading commentator reached this conclusion at the time. See Milton Han-
dler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CAL. L. 
REv. 182, 194 (1969) (arguing that "the test oflegality [in Albrecht] is not so much whether 
there was technically an unreasonable restraint of trade as whether the complainant, by 
entering into a contract ... , has surrendered his economic freedom"); see also Kauper, 
supra note 16, at 334 (arguing that 1960s vertical restraints doctrine had "become the vehi-
cle for redressing the imbalance of bargaining power which threatens the exercise of [a 
dealer's] independentjudgment"). 
64 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White,]., con-
curring in the judgment). 
65 See generaUy Kauper, supra note 16, at 330-31 (questioning, among other things, 
"whether the Court has simply used economic doctrine to support decisions arrived at 
upon other grounds"). On this score, there is a constructive comparison between Albrecht 
and United States v. Vons Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Writing for the m<gority in Von's 
Grocery, Justice Black was content to declare the merger in question unlawful because it was 
part of a trend toward concentration that threatened to eliminate the role of" 'small deal-
ers and worthy men'" in the Los Angeles grocery market. Id. at 274-78 (quoting United 
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897)). Justice White, who would 
author Albrecht tw·o years later, concurred, attempting to explain that the merger in ques-
tion would, in fact, lead to oligopolistic interdependence and higher prices. See id. at 280-
81 (White,]., concurring). By assigning the Albrecht opinion to Justice White, then, the 
Chief Justice assured the Court of two opinions for the price of one: Justice Black's con-
cern for trader freedom and Justice White's "fig leaf' economics. See generaUy Rowe, supra 
note 16, at 1524-25 (showing that, in the 1960s, the Court "fused Populist ideals with oli-
gopoly learning into strict anti-merger norms"). 
1999] INCOHERENCE IN ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 777 
B. The Collapse of Price Theory: Albrecht Meets the New 
Institutional Economics . · 
Albrecht rested upon a normative vision that is willing to elevate 
the welfare of traders over that of consumers; otherwise the Court 
would have had difficulty sustaining the decision. In reconsidering 
Albrecht, the Khan Court could have affirmed the dictum in Sylvania 
that trader freedom should play no role in antitrust doctrine. 66 Thus, 
the Court could have disposed of Albrecht and definitively asserted its 
position on the role of trader freedom in antitrust law. 
The Court chose another course, however, attempting to repudi-
ate Albrecht without questioning its normative vision at all. Just as the 
Albrecht Court had purported to rely upon economic theory in justify-
ing its decision to declare maximum rpm unlawful per se, the Khan 
Court invoked economics to rebut it. In so doing, the Court cited a 
large body of scholarship maintaining that maximum rpm likely 
benefitted consumers. 67 Much of this work reflected a reversal of the 
inhospitality tradition, a reversal that resulted from the new institu-
tional economics ("NIE")-the self-described antithesis to the price 
theoretic models that tacitly had informed the Court in Albrecht. 68 
Unlike price theory and the inhospitality tradition that it bred, 
which assumed that nonstandard contracts were coercive and monop-
olistic, the NIE established a presumption that such restraints were 
designed to attenuate the costs that might accompany a manufac-
turer's decision to rely upon a network of dealers to distribute its 
goods. 69 One such cost is the possibility that dealers will charge exor-
bitant prices, perhaps higher than those the manufacturer has adver-
tised. This price gouging, of course, can dilute the manufacturer's 
goodwill, as well as that of its other dealers, thereby reducing the over-
all demand for the product involved. 70 By adopting a maximum price 
limitation a manufacturer can prevent this behavior and protect itself, 
66 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. 
67 For instance, the Court relied very heavily upon (then) Professor Easterbrook's 
article, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 28. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 281-83 (citing this 
article four times). Like much of judge Easterbrook's work, this article abandoned the 
"inhospitality tradition" in favor of the benevolent attitude of the NIE. See, e.g., Easter-
brook, supra note 57, at 4-7 (condemning the inhospitality tradition); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANrrrRuST LJ. 135, 150 (1984) 
(applying N1E approach to vertical restraints). 
68 See WILLIAMSoN, supra note 54, at 1-2, 12-18; Meese, supra note 58, at 166-68 
(describing rivalry betlveen the N1E and price theory); see also supra notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text (describing how Albrecht reflected price-theoretic economics). 
69 SeeWILUAMSON, supra note 54, at 28 (characterizing the N1E as "maintain[ing] the 
rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes"). 
70 See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 
1984); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Beer Wholesalers Association, Inc. in Support of 
Petitioners at 7-8, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter National Beer Brief in Support of Peti-
tioners]; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 892-95; Meese, supra note 58, at 165-66, 188. 
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as well as those dealers who refrain from opportunistic gouging. 71 Al-
brecht, of course, involved just such an arrangement. 
By positing such benevolent explanations for maximum rpm, the 
NIE rebuts Albrecht's presumption that nonstandard contracts are co-
ercive or unnatural. Rather, it suggests that such arrangements may 
be part of a cooperative effort to serve consumers. 72 The Khan Court 
did not, by any means, articulate fully a new institutional framework 
for analyzing these agreements. Indeed, some scholars on whom the 
Court relied offered critiques of Albrecht internal to price theory. 73 
Still, following in the spirit of Sylvania, 74 the Khan Court's critique of 
Albrecht's economic analysis reflected a reversal of the inhospitable at-
titude toward nonstandard agreements. For instance, the Court sug-
gested that manufacturers would not deliberately set prices so low as 
to prevent dealers from offering essential services. 75 Also, the Court 
asserted that manufacturers have little incentive to exclude potential 
dealers from the market by attempting to channel distribution 
through only a few advantaged firms.76 Finally, the Justices opined 
that an arrangement that set prices so low as to disfavor inefficient 
dealers would not "necessarily" harm consumers. 77 In short, the Khan 
Court concluded that "the potential ir:yuries cited in Albrecht [were] 
less serious than the Court imagined."78 
Though basically correct, the Khan Court's exegesis was insuffi-
cient to repudiate Albrecht. Even on its face, Albrecht did not rest solely 
upon maximum rpm's (purported) economic consequences. In fact, 
Khan and his supporters did not rely solely upon the negative eco-
nomic consequences identified in Albrecht, but instead invoked the dis-
cretion of dealers to price according to their own best judgment. 79 As 
71 See jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d at 706; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 893-95; 
Meese, supra note 58, at 165-66. 
72 See Meese, supra note 58, at 188-89. 
73 See, e.g., Blair & Lang, supra note 45, at 1011-17 (arguing that manufacturers with 
market power can use maximum rpm to prevent dealers from adding to the monopoly 
markup already imposed by the manufacturer), cited with approval in Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 
282-83. 
74 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-59 (1977) (relying 
upon revised economic learning regarding vertical restraints to overrule United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)); WILLIAMSON, supra note 54, at 371-72 (attrib-
uting Sylvania's reversal of Schwinn to a rejection of the price-theoretic paradigm and ac-
companying inhospitality tradition). 
75 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282-83. 
76 See id. at 283. 
77 ld. 
78 /d. 
79 See Brief for Respondents at 3-9, Khan (No. 96-871); Joint Amicus Curiae Brief in 
Support of Respondent of National Coalition of Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service 
Dealers of America Automotive Trades Organization of California at 16-18, Khan (No. 96-
871) [hereinafter Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service Dealers Brief in Support of Re-
spondent]; Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Service Station and Convenience Store Associ-
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it had done in Sylvania, however, the Court refused to give dispositive 
weight to trader freedom. But unlike the Sylvania, Court, which had 
offered a normative vision different from Albrecht's, the Khan Court 
turned again to economics. The Court declared th<~;t Albrechfs claim 
that maximum rpm limited the freedom of traders, like its other asser-
tions, was merely "theoretical."80 As a matter of fact, the Khan Court 
said, the Albrecht rule actually conflicted with trader freedom in some 
instances. Echoing the contentions of several scholars, the Court 
claimed that the per se ban on maximum rpm had impelled some firms 
to integrate forward into distribution, thus eliminating the very in-
dependent businesses that Albrecht tried to protect.81 Accordingly, 
maximum rpm did not "always" or "almost always" infringe on trader 
freedom; rather, in some cases it actually enhanced it by averting the 
forward integration that would follow a ban on the practice. 
According to Khan, Albrecht's error lay not in its normative ac-
count of the effects that matter for antitrust purposes, but instead in 
its descriptive account of the effects that maximum rpm produces. 
Any disagreement between the two decisions, it seems, is purely tech-
nical. Indeed, in justifying its decision to overrule Albrecht despite the 
force of stare decisis, the Court declared that "the theoretical under-
pinnings of [Albrecht] are called into serious question."82 The repudi-
ation of Albrecht, the Khan Court wanted us to believe, was mandated 
by a change in scientific understandings that require a different appli-
cation of Albrecht's unchanged principles.83 This development ap-
peared to be entirely external to the Court .or its normative premises, 
occurring instead within the autonomous discipline of economics.84 
ation at 3, 11-12, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter Minnesota Service Station et al. Brief in 
Support of Respondent]. 
80 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282. 
81 See id. ("' [T)he ban on maximum resale price limitations declared in Albrecht in the 
name of 'dealer freedom' has actually prompted many suppliers to integrate fonvard into 
distribution, thus eliminating the very independent trader for whom. Albrecht professed so-
licitude.'" (quoting 7 [sic] PHILUP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw i 1635, at 395 (1989)); see 
also Ross, supra note 31, at 254 (noting that "[a]s a result of Albrecht, virtually every newspa-
per in the country has begun to use agents or employees rather than independent entities 
to distribute its issues"); Roger D. Blair & James M. Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the 
Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRAcusE L. REv. 43, 59-67, 72-73 (1986) (arguing that firms prohib-
ited from imposing maximum rpm will consider fonvard integration as an alternative). 
82 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284; see also id. at 285 (arguing that the Court could appropri-
ately overrule Albrecht even though it shoUld "not 'lightly assume that the economic reali-
ties underlying earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those 
realities were in error'" (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 
732 (1988))). 
83 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1247-1250 (1993) 
(describing such an interpretive approach in the antitrust context). 
84 I do not mean to argue that this change in economic theory was in fact unrelated 
to the Court or antitrust doctrine, only that it appeared exogenous. After all, many advances 
in theory seem to have occurred in at least partial response to decisions protecting the 
freedom of traders. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Anti-
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In discarding Albrecht, then, the Court joined those scholars-particu-
larly members of the consumer welfare school-who have asserted 
that revised understandings of economic theory ipso facto require re-
pudiation of the antitrust jurisprudence associated with the trader 
freedom era. 85 
The Khan Court purportedly based its decision on positive eco-
nomics. As a result, it neither criticized Albrechfs normative vision nor 
affirmed the contrary vision as expressed in Sylvania's dictum. Khan's 
failure to affirm Sylvanids dictum may have been an oversight and 
thus not reflective of any conscious decision to avoid speaking in a 
normative voice. This explanation seems unlikely, however, for the 
material before the Court quite squarely presented it with the choice 
between competing normative visions. For instance, the brief of the 
United States, upon which the Court relied, quoted Sylvania's dictum 
arguing explicitly that trader freedom should play no role in the de-
velopment of antitrust doctrine. 86 A second brief, supporting contin-
ued adherence to Albrechfs per se rule, urged the Court to resist the 
"myth" that Sylvania had abandoned trader freedom. 87 Other briefs 
reiterated the contention of the United States and maintained that 
Sylvania had repudiated Albrechf s solicitude for trader freedom. 88 Fi-
nally, a law review article on which the Court relied quoted Sylvania's 
dictum and claimed that the decision signalled the Court's repudia-
trust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979) (employing 
Schwinn as an instance in which the Court misunderstood the economics of vertical rela-
tionships and advocating departure from the inhospitality tradition). 
85 See Bork, supra note 28, at 186-92; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 925-33 (1979); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allccating Antitrust 
Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. LJ. 305, 308-09 (1987) ("The empirical foundation on which 
much antitrust policy was built has been washed away."). 
86 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Reversal at 22-23, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter United States Brief Support-
ing Reversal]; see also Khan, ll8 S. Ct. at 283 (asserting that "amici curiae have [not] called 
our attention to any cases in which enforcement efforts have been directed solely against 
the conduct encompassed by Albrecht's per se rule"); United States Brief Supporting Rever-
sal, supra, at 24-25 (asserting that the government has not pursued a case of maximum rpm 
after Albrecht). 
87 See Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service Dealers Brief in Support of Respondent, 
supra note 79, at 17-18 (arguing that Sylvania's footnote 21 did not "put[ ] to bed any 
antitrust concern over the right and ability of small businesses to compete"); see also Minne-
sota Service Station et al. Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 79, at 12 n.13 (argu-
ing that footnote 21 did not reject trader freedom as a relevant consideration when price 
restraints are concerned). 
88 See, e.g., National Beer Brief in Support of Petitioners, supra note 70, at 3 ("The per 
se rule set forth in Albrecht ... is plainly inconsistent with the 'consumer welfure' and 
'competition based on efficiency' premises of modern antitrust law .... "); Brief of the 
American Petroleum Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, 16-17, Khan 
(No. 96-871) (arguing that Sylvania "decisively rejected" any role for trader freedom). 
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tion of trader freedom as a goal accorded weight under the antitrust 
laws.89 
C. A Poor Translation: Khan's Implicit Rejection of Trader 
Freedom 
The practice of adjusting antitrust doctrine to reflect advances in 
economic theory has a solid pedigree, including antecedents predat-
ing the Sherman Act itself. 90 This approach, which some commenta-
tors refer to as "translation," ensures that the law continues to 
promote the values Congress meant to implement as the world or our 
understanding of it changes.91 On the surface, Khan's treatment of 
Alhrecht seems to fall squarely within this tradition. Closer analysis, 
however, demonstrates that Khan's purely descriptive critique of Al-
brechtultimately comes up short; economic theory simply cannot do all 
of the work the Court assigned to it. 
Alhrecht did not really depend upon any assertion that the inci-
dence of negative economic consequences of maximum rpm are "seri-
ous" or even, for that matter, "likely." To the contrary, the Court 
simply asserted that such consequences "may" occur.92 Convincing as 
it was, Khan's demonstration that these consequences are not likely 
does not undermine Alhrecht, at least not when taken on its own terms. 
Similarly, Khan's assertion that maximum rpm agreements that 
drive inefficient dealers out of business would not "necessarily" harm 
consumers may be entirely correct as a matter of economic theory. 
Yet it simply begs the question: whether harm to consumers or the 
welfare of dealers is the appropriate concern for antitrust purposes. 
For the Alhrecht Court, trader freedom trumped the welfare of con-
sumers, and the Court plainly favored inefficient dealers harmed by 
89 See Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 888 ("The Supreme Court has overruled Schwinn 
and explicitly rejected any analysis that makes antitrust cases turn on the 'autonomy of 
independent businessmen.' Arguments about the effect of a practice on quantity and 
price, not arguments about freedom and autonomy, control antitrust analysis." (quoting 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,53 n.21 (1977))). The Khan Court 
approvingly cited pages 887-890 of this article. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 281 (footnote 
omitted). 
90 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-34 (1988); Sylva-
nia, 433 U.S. at 47-59; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61 
(1933); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-60 (1911); Gibbs v. Consolidated 
Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 
(N.Y. 1887); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-141 (WIS. 1851); see also HoVENKAMP, supra 
note 9, § 2.2a, at 59-61 (tracing influence of changes in economic theory on antitrust 
doctrine). 
91 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J .L. & EcoN. 
7, 48 (1966) (arguing that Congress intended the courts to adjust antitrust doctrine in 
response to changes in economic theory); Lessig, supra note 83, at 1247-50 (applying the-
ory of interpretive translation in the antitrust context). 
92 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53. 
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maximum rpm over the consumers who enjoyed its benefits. Khan's 
contrary determination, that inefficient dealers deserve no protection, 
rests upon an unexpressed normative choice and not any advances in 
economic theory. 
But what of the Court's assertion that Albrecht led to forward inte-
gration to the detriment of dealers? Certainly this argument did not 
depend upon a rejection of Albrechfs normative vision, or did it? The 
empirical basis for the Court's finding is at best inadequate. Vertical 
integration may have costs of its own, costs that may prevent the adop-
tion of such a strategy. 93 Khan, after all, had received his dealership 
well after Albrecht, which therefore did not interfere with his free-
dom.94 In support of its assertion that Albrecht impelled significant 
forward integration, the Court cited but one scholar, who in tum pro-
vided only one example in which such integration had occurred: the 
newspaper industry.95 Thus, the Court's hypothesis about the effects 
of Albrecht upon "dealer freedom" is sheer guesswork, with no stronger 
basis in empirical fact than, for instance, Albrechfs own assertion that 
maximum rpm would prevent dealers from providing essential serv-
ices.96 One suspects that like the Albrecht Court's "concern" for the 
negative effects of maximum rpm, Khan's concern for forward integra-
tion is a convenient pretext designed to support a predetermined de-
cision to disregard trader freedom. 97 
93 See Sanford]. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pot.. EcoN. 691, 716 (1986) ("[Complete] 
integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and distortionary behavior, but it does 
not remove these incentives."). 
94 In fact, there is evidence that dealer-run gasoline stations generally face lower costs 
than those owned by manufacturers. SeeS. REP. No. 102-450, at 6 (1992) (concluding that 
independent gasoline stations face lower costs than company-owned outlets). 
95 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282 (quoting 7 [sic] AREEDA, supra note 81, ~ 1635, at 395); 
id. (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw~ 729.7, at 599-614 
(1996 Supp.)). 
96 I do not mean to suggest that it would be impossible to build an empirical case in 
support of the Court's assumption. Mter all, the burden of creating such a case would be 
far lighter than the burden of establishing per se illegality. To invoke per se treatment, the 
Court must conclude that a practice "always" or "almost always" has a prohibited effect. See 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-34 (1990). Thus, proof that a 
practice does not engender a "prohibited effect" in a significant proportion of cases would 
be sufficient to defeat application of the per se rule. The Khan Court, however, did not 
define "significant"; nor did it point to any such proof. Thus, even if such evidence should 
come to light, one cannot conclude that the Court based its decision on any bona fide 
concern for "trader freedom." 
97 Ironically, there is one sense in which advances in economic theory do suggest that 
maximum rpm enhances dealer freedom. To the extent that a manufacturer demands 
maximum rpm agreements to protect its distribution system-including dealers-from op-
portunistic price gouging, such agreements are best characterized as voluntary integration 
that, like many contracts, enhance the freedom of dealers. See Meese, supra note 58, at 188-
89. The Khan Court, however, did not recognize this implication of the NIE. 
1999] INCOHERENCE IN ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 783 
Finally, the (purported) fact that a per se rule against maximum 
rpm has produced some fonvard integration does not, by itself, under-
mine Albrecht, absent rejection of its normative vision. The feasibility 
of vertical integration is a function of antitrust doctrine, which con-
demns certain forms of fonvard integration as monopolistic.98 In-
deed, in expressing concern over Albrecht-induced fonvard 
integration, the Court relied on a scholar who cited only instances in 
which such integration induced newspaper carriers to bring monopo-
lization suits.99 
Whether the Court would deem monopolistic the sort of fonvard 
integration that Albrecht envisioned depends, in part, upon the scope 
of the relevant market.100 Most manufacturers will not have monopo-
lies and thus would be able to integrat~ fonvard with impunity. Enter 
the Court's fairly recent decision in Eastman Kodak, Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Services, Inc. 101 In Kodak, a decision that some traced to concern 
for small businesses, the Court held that the presence of sunk invest-
ments and information costs could create a market-there a market 
for Kodak spare parts sold to uninformed purchasers-for antitrust 
purposes.102 Like the customers in Kodak, dealers also incur sunk 
costs and may not be fully informed of the possibility that their suppli-
ers will act opportunistically.103 Thus, it is conceptually possible to 
define the dealership opportunity itself as a relevant market over 
which the manufacturer maintains a monopoly.104 This similarity be-
98 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 368-69, 375 
(1927). 
99 See 8 AREEDA, supra note 81, i 1635, at 395; 3 PmLLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HoVENKAMP, ANrrrnuST LAw i 729 (rev. ed. 1996). Similarly, in claiming that Albrecht had 
led to fonvard integration, the United States could cite only cases in which such integra-
tion had spawned lengthy antitrust litigation. See United States Brief Supporting Reversal, 
supra note 86, at 23 n.10 (citing Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473, 475 
(9th Cir. 1985); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane)}. 
100 See Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding 
fonvard integration by the New York Times Company lawful because, inter alia, it faced 
competition from other papers). 
101 504 u.s. 451 (1992). 
102 See id. at 462-63, 477-79; see also Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image 
Technical Senices, Inc.-Infonnation Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 759, 766 
(1994) (arguing that Kodak rested upon a desire to protect opportunities for independent 
providers of repair and maintenance senices for Kodak copiers). 
103 See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or HalfFuU?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 
62 ANTITRUST LJ. 177, 185-88 (1993) (describing possible extensions of Kodak to the 
franchise context}; see also Fox, supra note 102, at 766 (contending that, if Kodak were 
taken to its logical conclusion, "[f]loodgates would open for franchisees to sue 
franchisors"). 
104 See Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies for 
Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 105, 13641 (1996); Hay, supra note 103, at 185-
86. Courts have yet to reach a consensus on whether a dealership opportunity can be a 
relevant market. Compare Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438-
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tween dealers and the Kodak consumers bolsters the argument that 
"unfair" conduct, such as foiWard integration by manufacturers, is an 
abuse of monopoly power.105 
In Khan, the Court was not in a position to address Kodak's rele-
vance in the dealership context. Thus, it is difficult to infer from the 
Court's indifference toward foiWard integration a conclusion that 
manufacturers generally will lack monopoly power. After all, the only 
examples of such integration, of which the Court was made aware, 
involved firms that courts had deemed monopolists before the Kodak 
decision.106 
Fonvard integration by a monopolist is lawful only if a legitimate 
justification supports it.107 Yet this simply begs the question as to what 
is "legitimate." Is it legitimate for a manufacturer to integrate because 
its costs of distribution, and thus prices, are lower than those of its 
dealers? Or would this integration constitute predatory conduct, sub-
jecting the manufacturer to treble damages?108 The answer depends 
upon whether the Court construes the Sherman Act to ensure the sur-
vival of small dealers against the onslaught of more efficient manufac-
turers-a question the Court has not addressed explicitly.109 
41 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that franchise opportunity constituted relevant market 
because obligations creating relationship were contractual in nature), with Collins v. Inter-
national Dairy Queen, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 875, 877-80 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (relying on Kodak for 
proposition that franchisor possessed "monopoly" over franchise opportunity). For a pow-
erful argument that the sort of market imperfections identified in Kodak should not give 
rise to market power, see Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak 
and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (I994). 
105 See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 714-21 (7th Cir. 1979); Grimes, 
supra note 104, at 136-41. 
106 See United States Brief Supporting Reversal, supra note 86, at 23 n.10 (citing Pas-
chall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane), a case decided 
prior to Kodak, as support for the claim that Albrecht led to forward integration). 
107 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-86; Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 608-11 (1985); Grimes, supra note 104, at 141. 
108 Cf Paschal~ 727 F.2d at 695 (rejecting the panel's conclusion that the newspaper's 
forward integration was monopolistic because the integration allowed the firm to "set an 
area-wide uniform price for its newspapers and provide readers with better, more respon-
sive service"). 
109 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 n.11 (1986) (reserving 
the question whether efficiency driven, above-cost pricing that drives a firm out of business 
can produce "antitrust injury" in light of social and political values). To be sure, in Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), the Court held that a dealer did not 
suffer "antitrust injury" when it incurred lost profits due to a competing dealer's adherence 
to a maximum rpm agreement, so long as the prices fixed by the agreement were not 
predatory. See id. at 339-46. ARGO's application of the "antitrust injury" requirement, par-
ticularly its focus on whether the prices set by the scheme were predatory, could have been 
read to suggest that the Court no longer considered the limitation on trader freedom 
caused by maximum rpm of independent consequence under the antitrust laws. Still, the 
plaintiff in ARGO was not a party to the agreement in question, and other language in the 
opinion suggested that a dealer constrained by such an agreement could suffer antitrust 
injury, even if the agreement did not fix predatory prices. See id. at 345 ("If [maximum 
rpm] causes the anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht, consumers and the man-
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Adherence to Alhrechfs normative vision would seem to require con-
demnation of this variety of forward integration as monopolistic.110 
Khan, on the other hand, suggests the opposite, opining that a maxi-
mum rpm scheme that reduces prices so much as to harm inefficient 
dealers is still "not necessarily harmful to competition and consum-
ers."111 Thus, in asserting that the Alhrecht rule encourages forward 
integration, Khan apparently rejected sub silentio Alhrechfs normative 
preference for dealers over consumers. 
III 
AvoiDING THE QUESTION: THE CouRT's CoNTINUING 
AMBIVALENCE TOWARD TRADER FREEDOM 
Despite its implicit rejection of Alhrechfs normative vision, Khan 
does not rule out a subsequent embrace of trader freedom in other 
doctrinal contexts. Mter all, the Court purported to assum(;! that 
trader freedom was a relevant consideration and thus, unlike Sylvania, 
cannot be cited as rejecting it outright. Moreover, Khan arguably re-
jects Sylvania's dictum. At the least, the Court retains maximum flexi-
bility in determining the significance of trader freedom, maintaining 
for instance, the option to reaffirm those decisions that depend upon 
concerns over the autonomy of traders and others. By saying one 
thing while doing another, the Court has ensured that the role of 
trader freedom in antitrust policy will remain in a state of flux. 
This state of affairs should not continue indefinitely. To be pre-
cise, the resolution of numerous pending doctrinal questions should 
require the Court to confront directly the normative question it 
avoided in Khan. For instance, several scholars, including some on 
whom the Khan Court relied, have advocated a rule of per se legality 
for various vertical restraints, such as maximum rpm.112 Such treat-
ment, of course, is only appropriate if the practice in question never-
ufacturers' own dealers may bring suit." (second emphasis added)); Roger D. Blair & John E. 
Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 123, 136-
37 (1998). 
110 See, e.g., Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-
43 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding a manufacturer's efficiency-based forward integration an abuse 
of monopoly power). 
111 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283 (emphasis added). 
112 See, e.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 81, ~ 1638b, at 419-20 (arguing that maximum rpm 
should be lawful unless (1) the "maximum" is really a minimum or (2) the manufacturer is 
engaged in predatory pricing-both independent violations of the Sherman Act); Bork, 
supra note 28, at 181-82 (concluding that "antitrust should have no concern with vertical 
restraints; all should be lawful"); Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 887 (arguing that "maxi-
mum price fixing is almost always beneficial"); Richard A Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981) (arguing 
that resale price maintenance agreements should be per se lawful). 
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or almost never-has any negative consequences.113 Yet if trader free-
dom is of significant value to antitrust doctrine, any vertical restraint 
will have "negative consequences." Thus, Rule of Reason scrutiny, not 
per se legality, is the most appropriate treatment. If, on the other 
hand, the Court jettisons trader freedom, per se legality is more likely 
appropriate. This is not to say that a determination whether a prac-
tice is per se lawful necessarily will require a choice between competing 
normative visions. While the adoption of a rule of per se legality logi-
cally would require the rejection of trader freedom, the Court could 
embrace a Rule of Reason standard without choosing between traders 
and consumers. More precisely, the Court could determine that a 
particular class of restraint poses a threat to consumers sufficient to 
avoid per se legality, regardless of whether trader freedom is a cogniza-
ble value under the Sherman Act. 
Even if the Court rejects rules of per se legality without embracing 
trader freedom, the content of any Rule of Reason analysis for vertical 
restraints will depend upon the normative role that the Court assigns 
to this value. If the Court embraces trader freedom, any contractual 
restraint would be deemed to produce an anticompetitive effect, to be 
weighed-in one way or another-against the restraint's benefits. If, 
on the other hand, the Court repudiates trader freedom, it would en-
sure a purely economic analysis. Take as an example the law gov-
erning exclusive territories. According to scholars who see consumers 
as the sole beneficiaries of antitrust, proof that such a restraint will 
lead to higher prices should be a necessary condition for liability 
under the Rule of Reason. 114 Adopting trader freedom as an opera-
tive goal of antitrust, however, would require a different mode of anal-
ysis. Courts could hold, for instance, that the existence of the 
restraint ipso facto establishes a prima facie case, thus shifting the bur-
den of justification to the proponent of the restraint. 115 
Although it appears that the Court will have to determine explic-
itly whether trader freedom merits normative significance under the 
antitrust laws, history suggests that it will not do so any time soon. 
Despite its declining docket, the Court, in the two decades since Sylva-
nia, has avoided any case that would require it to elaborate on the 
113 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 
983, 987 (1987) (deeming per se legality appropriate if 80% of the conduct in question is 
"beneficial"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DuKE LJ. 1014, 1020-
21 ("Per se legality is appropriate only if we can be relatively sure that every instance of 
[the restraint in question] is competitively harmless."). 
114 See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REv. 933, 
948-49 (1987); Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 135. 
115 This position, it should be noted, is taken by many of those in the so-called Populist 
school of antitrust. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 31, at 242-46 & n.51; Bohling, supra note 29, 
at 513-15; Flynn, supra note 29, at 1143-46. 
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content of Rule of Reason analysis. As a result, lower courts have as-
sumed the responsibility of dealing with this _normative question. In-
deed, the Khan Court continued this practice, remanding the case for 
a Rule of Reason analysis without indicating whether the lower court 
should include in its calculus the restraint's effect on trader free-
dom.ll6 The lower courts, in turn, have refused to accord any norma-
tive significance to trader freedom.l17 This tendency to refrain from 
articulating antitrust policy extends beyond vertical restraints and is, 
in fact, part of a larger pattern. For instance, the Court has heard 
only two merger cases since 1974, neither of which dealt directly with 
the substantive law of mergers.118 In each case, the Court narrowed 
the class of private parties who may challenge mergers, with the result 
that the Government now brings nearly all such actions.l19 As it has 
done with vertical restraints, the Court has left the difficult questions 
to other actors who have refused to accord trader freedom any 
significance.12° 
IV 
BALANCING LEGmMACY AGAINST CoHERENCE IN A WoRLD 
OF CHANGING THEORY 
A. Maintaining Appearances: The Court's Refusal to Choose 
Between Traders and Consumers in Khan 
More cynical observers may perceive Khan as part of a less-than-
candid campaign slowly and silently to excise trader freedom as a rele-
vant concern of antitrust regulation. By resting its decision solely 
upon economic theory, the Court arguably has avoided accountability 
for its choice to repudiate Albrecht's normative vision. Moreover, if its 
116 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 285. 
117 Instead, these courts have uniformly held that to state a prima facie case under the 
Rule of Reason, plaintiffs challenging vertical restraints must show that the agreement will 
lead to higher prices for consumers. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto 
Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRuST LJ. 67, 71-73 (1991) (concluding that plain-
tiffs only have prevailed in cases in which they were able to establish the existence of an-
ticompetitive effects, namely, a reduction in intrabrand competition that led to higher 
prices). 
118 See Cargill, Inc, v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl·O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
119 See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private 
Incentive and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MrcH. L. REv. 1, 9·10, 45 (1995) (observing that 
recent changes in standing doctrine have shifted merger enforcement responsibility to 
government actors). 
120 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guideli~es for Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) (promulgating standards governing en· 
forcement agencies' decisions to challenge mergers). In defining its overall objectives, the 
Guidelines note that "the Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger 
universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral." I d. at 41,553 (em-
phasis added). 
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treatment of merger law and non price restraints is any indication, the 
Court will leave the content of Rule of Reason analysis to the lower 
courts, ensuring that trader freedom plays no role in the regulation of 
maximum rpm. If this cynical view is accurate, it may be only a matter 
of time before the Court altogether abandons trader freedom as a 
value in antitrust analysis. Just as prior Courts employed economic 
theory to justify decisions that enhanced trader freedom, the Khan 
Court has used new theory to mask its repudiation of this value. 
A different diagnosis of the problem, however, assigns an alterna-
tive role to economic theory and suggests a different fate for trader 
freedom, at least in the short run. This diagnosis begins with a com-
monplace observation: judges are acutely sensitive to the appearance 
that they are making law rather than expounding it. Without the 
purse, sword, or democratically derived legitimacy, the Court must de-
pend upon public esteem for the implementation of its decisions.I21 
This esteem, in tum, depends upon the public's belief that the Jus-
tices are engaged in a legal enterprise and not a political one.122 
When judges step outside their assigned role and appear to act politi-
cally, they incur costs-what one scholar has called "illegitimacy 
costs."123 All else being equal, judges will make decisions in a manner 
that avoids the appearance of formulating policy and thereby mini-
mizes illegitimacy costs.124 
121 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The 
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction."); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223 
(1882); JESSE H. CHoPER, JuDiciAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL PoLITICAL PRoCESS 139 
(1980) ("The fortress of judicial review stands or falls with public opinion and the Court's 
symbolic image .... "). 
122 See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections B(}-
tweenLaw and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 236-40 (1968); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 
267 (Frankfurter,]., dissenting) ("[Respect for the Court's judgments] must be nourished 
by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entangle-
ments and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political 
settlements."); THURMON W. ARNoLD, THE SYMBoLS OF GoVERNMENT 49 (1935) ("An official 
admission by a judicial institution that it was moving in all directions at once in order to 
satisfy the conflicting emotional values of the people which it served would be 
unthinkable."). 
123 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1365, 1387 (1997); see 
also Deutsch, supra note 122, at 237-39 (arguing that the Court has a "symbolic function" 
that requires it to act and speak like a purely legal institution); Kauper, supra note 16, at 
335-36 (arguing that the Court's failure to articulate the true basis for antitrust decisions 
produced "an increasing cynicism about its methods and results which threatens ... ulti-
mately to jeopardize acceptance of its commands"). 
124 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Profes-
sor Lessig's Theory ofTranslation, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1435, 1454-55 (1997) ("Supreme Court 
Justices and other federal judges always try to justify their decisions by writing opinions that 
appeal to the constitutional text, to history, and to prior caselaw. Such appeals are what 
the Justices' employers-the American people-expect from their Court."); Lawrence Les-
sig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395, 426-42 (1995). 
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Against this backdrop, one easily can understand why the Khan 
Court declined to pursue "trader freedom" seriously. The Justices un-
doubtedly realized that protection of such freedom would come with 
a price-literally-to be paid by consumers. Recognition of trader 
freedom as a relevant factor, then, would have begged the question of 
whether the freedom that Albrecht protected is worth the accompany-
ing cost that consumers must bear. By refusing to accord trader free-
dom any independent weight, the Court avoided the prospect of 
balancing trader freedom against consumer welfare, an enterprise 
that inevitably would have cast the Justices in a policy-making role. 
Of course, these same considerations operated on the Court in 
Albrecht and other decisions in the trader freedom era, and yet the 
Court, as we have seen, did engage in such trade o:ffs. However, judi-
cial ideology to one side, at least two interrelated factors must account 
for the current Court's stance toward trader freedom. First, for rea-
sons wholly external to antitrust law, economic theory, and trader 
freedom, the notion of "balancing" one value against another now 
stands in far less repute.I25 In 1968, a mainstream antitrust scholar 
could ask the Court to weigh openly trader freedom against consumer 
welfare, without even hinting that such balancing might be inconsis-
tent with the judicial function.126 The Court's candor was all that mat-
tered.I27 Today, should the Court balance one value against 
another-particularly values as incommensurable as trader freedom 
and consumer welfare-it almost certainly will subject itself to charges 
that it improperly has assumed a legislative function.128 Indeed, the 
Court expressly has recognized as much, sometimes rejecting invita-
tions to engage in balancing for this very reason.I29 While the current 
Court may be no more or less concerned about the appearance of 
125 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 
943 (1987) (tracing the rise and spread of balancing and offering a critique). 
126 See Kauper, supra note 16, at 330-34. 
127 See id. at 335-36 (arguing that the Court's lack of candor had resulted in "increasing 
cynicism about its methods" thus "impairing the credibility of the judicial process"). 
128 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 125, at 972-76, 984-86; Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the 
Community and the judicial Balanee: The Jurisprudence of justice Powell, 97 YALE LJ. 1, 56-59 
(1987); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHr. L. REv. 1175 (1989); see 
also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,]., 
concurring in judgment) (chiding the Court for balancing incommensurate values be-
cause such an approach "is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy"). 
129 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 527-28 (1996) (Thomas, 
]., concurring) (criticizing the balancing test governing regulation of commercial speech 
as an "inherently nondeterminate" standard that required courts to "weigh incommen-
surables" such that "individual judicial preferences will govern application of the test"); 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990) ("[I]t is horrible to contemplate 
that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the signifi-
cance of religious practice."). 
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acting in a political manner, balancing, which once seemed judicial, 
now appears political. 
Second, advances in economic thinking have made the existence 
of such balancing more apparent. While the advances in economic 
theory that undermined the inhospitality tradition did not ipso facto 
undermine Albrecht, they nonetheless did emphasize and elaborate on 
the nature and extent of the trade off between dealers and consumers 
that Albrecht entailed. As a result, the Khan Court could no longer 
legitimately assert that it could protect dealers without really harming 
consumers.130 Indeed, one even could say that these advances raised 
the possibility that Albrecht struck the balance incorrectly. Adherence 
to trader freedom, then, necessarily would have required the Court to 
balance dealers against consumers anew, and to do so in a much more 
explicit manner. Such an overt rebalancing would have required the 
Court to incur higher illegitimacy costs than those that had accompa-
nied Albrecht. 
One finds an analogy in, of all places, administrative law. For 
nearly two centuries, the Court was generally willing to second guess 
agency interpretations of statutes, purporting to "find" or "locate" the 
law by discerning congressional intent. Eventually, however, legal cul-
ture came to see the enterprise ofinterpretation as an exercise in judi-
cial policy making, at least when the underlying statute "\vas 
ambiguous.131 This realization led the Court to abandon its willing-
ness to review agency interpretations de novo on the grounds that 
such second-guessing would require the Court to resolve "competing 
political interests."I32 
130 Cf. Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 17, at 331-32 (asserting that during the 1970s 
and 1980s, new economic learning demonstrated that "ideologies of various stripes could 
not all be satisfied simultaneously [and that p]opulist objectives could be attained ouly at 
the sacrifice of economic objectives"). 
131 See Richard]. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Ajtennath: judicial Review of Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 305 (1988) ("When a court 'interprets' 
imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory language in a particular manner, the court 
is resolving a policy issue."); Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. v, v-vi 
(Summer 1982) (admonishing agencies to make decisions that are "manifestations of the 
popular will through the political process" and not based on "goals no more specific than 
'the public interest, convenience and necessity'"); see also Lessig, supra note 124, at 436-38 
(discussing Chevron and how, after this decision, "a federal court must defer to an agency 
interpretation of [an] ambiguous [statutory] provision"). 
132 Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
( 1984); see also Thomas W. Merrill, judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 
978-79 (1992) ("[T]he most apparent objective [of Chevron] was to maximize the role of 
democratically accountable institutions in the process oflegal interpretation and to restrict 
the discretion of unelected courts."). A portion of the Chevron Court's language is worth 
quoting here: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile compet-
ing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy 
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated poli-
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Similar considerations were apparently at work in the evolution 
from Albrecht to Khan. Just as changes in legal culture led the Justices 
to view the interpretation of ambiguous statutes as a political enter-
prise, advances in economic theory led the Court -to believe that pro-
tection of trader freedom would require it to make inherently political 
trade offs.133 By overruling Albrecht and returning the question to the 
lower courts, the Court avoided the institutional cost associated with 
balancing incommensurable values. 
This is not to suggest that the Court has embraced, sub silentio, 
Sylvania's dictum asserting that an antitrust policy giving credence to 
trader freedom would "lack any objective benchmarks" and thus 
should be disfavored.134 Perhaps some Justices, maybe even a major-
ity, ultimately would agree with this dictum and the "consumer wel-
fare" standard it implies. On the other hand, it seems possible that 
some Justices who joined the unanimous Khan opinion would reject 
Sylvania's dictum out of support for trader freedom, a commitment to 
balancing, or both.135 Still, even a Justice who is personally enthusias-
tic about the enterprise of balancing traders against consumers pre-
sumably understands that such a course is costly-within today's legal 
culture anyway-and should be avoided if possible. Thus, while Sylva-
nia's dictum may not reflect the substantive position of all the Justices, 
it may be suggestive of the sort of incentives that influence their 
behavior. 
Of course, courts regularly engage in the enterprise of balancing. 
For instance, they weigh the value of potential life against a mother's 
right to choose an abortion.136 They also regularly balance the com-
munity's right to safety against the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy.137 Yet the analysis offered here did not begin with the premise 
cymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly 
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing in-
terests which Congress itself ... did not resolve •... 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
133 C.f. .AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, 'i'i 111-13 (arguing that the Court should 
not, absent clear evidence to the contrary, impute to Congress a desire to empower judges 
to balance consumer welfare against other values); BoRK, supra note 33, at 79-89 (arguing 
that consideration of values other than consumer welfare in the development of antitrust 
doctrine would require the Court to engage in trade offs involving social and political 
questions, a process that would be inconsistent with the judicial function). 
134 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). 
135 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. M!AMr L. REv. 277, 280 
(1986) (arguing that the Sherman Act should be interpreted "as a charter of freedom 
because it is designed to enlarge the opportunity for independent decision making" (inter-
nal quotation marks and footnote omitted)). 
136 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
137 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
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that illegitimacy costs are prohibitive-only that they are present-
and will be dispositive other things being equal. However, other things 
are not always equal. It is one thing occasionally to leave antitrust 
policy to the lower courts or the Department of Justice. On the other 
hand, when constitutional questions are involved, the Court's self-im-
age as expositor of particular constitutional values no doubt comes 
into play, steeling it against illegitimacy costs that may flow from bal-
ancing.138 By avoiding the appearance of political decision making in 
Khan, the Court preserved its political capital for those instances in 
which it cares to act.139 
If this account makes sense, one may justifiably ask why the Court 
simply did not explicitly abandon trader freedom altogether. Two in-
terrelated considerations may explain the Court's failure to do so. 
First, an open acknowledgment by the Court that it is aware of polit-
ical costs may itself entail some costs-imagine the Justices writing "we 
hereby overrule Albrecht because adherence to that decision would en-
tail a high reputational cost." Thus, the only practical means of excis-
ing trader freedom from the law would be to question directly 
Albrechfs normative premises, that is, to overrule Albrecht by asserting 
that consumer welfare is the sole standard by which the Court will 
measure trade restraints. Such a direct repudiation of the Court's 
prior normative vision, not based on any intervening events other 
than changes in the Court's membership, would appear political and 
thus entail illegitimacy costs of its own.140 
138 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864-69 (describing the Court's rather ex-
pansive vision of its role in the articulation of constitutional values); John 0. McGinnis, 
C011Stitutional Review l7y the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Ra-
tional Choice, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB., Autumn 1993, at 293, 306-307 & nn.66-67 (asserting 
that the Court has staked out individual rights as its special preserve while ceding authority 
over other constitutional questions to the political branches). 
139 See CHOPER, supra note 121, at 164-70 (arguing that the Court should preserve its 
political capital by deferring to other branches of government in all but individual rights 
cases). 
140 See Deborah Helhnan, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 1107 
(1995) (describing the illegitimacy costs that courts incur when they overrule precedents 
for apparently political reasons); Lessig, supra note 123, at 1391-92. Various Justices have 
recognized these costs, albeit often in dissent. For example, according to Justice Stewart: 
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in 
our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is 
little different from the two political branches of the Government. No mis-
conception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of 
law which it is our abiding mission to serve. 
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also 
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864 ("To overrule prior law for no other reason than mere 
disagreement with it would run counter to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to 
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was 
wrongly decided."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("It 
certainly has never been a postulate of judicial power that mere altered disposition, or 
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Second, suggesting that prior Justices fundamentally had misread 
the antitrust laws would call the Court's own competence into ques-
tion.141 Even Justices who would reject a role for trader freedom in 
antitrust doctrine as an original matter may find it costly to discard 
explicitly this value and the precedents it supports. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the Khan Court chose to clothe its decision in the garb of 
positive economics. It costs far less for the Court to say "our predeces-
sors did their best, given the economics of the time" than to say "our 
predecessors did not understand what the antitrust laws are all about." 
The Khan Court, then, was between the proverbial rock and a 
hard place. Any endorsement of trader freedom could not be con-
fined to the context of maximum rpm. As a result, reaffirmation of 
Alhrecht would have left the Court continually balancing trader free-
dom against consumer welfare in a variety of doctrinal settings-an 
apparently political task with the accompanying reputational costs. 
Explicit repudiation of Alhrecht's normative premises, on the other 
hand, itself would have entailed a significant cost. 
By seeking refuge in the objectivity of economic theory and by 
focusing only on the effect maximum rpm might have on consumers, 
the Court avoided these two unsavory alternatives while appearing 
simply to implement the conclusions of neutral experts. To be sure, 
this course is not without cost. More perceptive observers will recog-
nize that changes in economic theory did not by themselves justify the 
repudiation of Alhrecht. When forced to choose between candor and 
the appearance of legitimacy, the Court understandably chose the 
latter. 
The course taken in Khan was not entirely inevitable. To be sure, 
the Court could only avoid the appearance of political behavior by 
refusing to stake out a clear, consistent position regarding the role of 
trader freedom. The apparently political nature of a decision to speak 
vaguely, however, was not a given. Instead, this choice was a function 
of the current state of (highly contested) discourse within the acad-
emy and elsewhere regarding the normative vision Congress meant to 
incorporate within the antitrust laws.142 At one time, perhaps, a suffi-
ciently strong consensus existed that Congress designed the antitrust 
laws to protect trader freedom at the expense of consumers.143 Even 
absent such a consensus, the Alhrecht Court credibly could claim, 
subsequent membership on the Court, is sufficient warrant for overturning a deliberately 
decided rule of Constitutional law."). 
141 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 866 ("There is a limit to the amount of error that 
can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts."). 
142 Cf. Lessig, supra note 123, at 412 (observing that discourses are not permanently or 
naturally "contested" or "uncontested"). 
143 See supra notes 12-13 (collecting authorities from trader freedom era concluding 
that antitrust laws were designed to protect traders at the expense of consumers). 
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based on the dominant economic paradigm of the time, that traders 
could be protected without harming consumers.144 However, the rela-
tively recent realization associated with advances in economic the-
ory-that the protection of traders often occurs at the expense of 
consumers-has led many scholars to question whether Congress in 
fact contemplated such a trade off. As a result, any possible consensus 
suggesting that the antitrust laws empower the Court to engage in 
such trade offs has long since evaporated.145 Absent the emergence of 
a new scholarly consensus regarding antitrust's normative founda-
tions, the Court's reticence to speak in a clear normative voice likely 
will continue.146 
B. A Poor Prognosis: Legitimacy and the Continuing 
Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine 
This Essay's analysis, it is submitted, explains the course taken in 
Khan. Further, unlike claims that the Court quietly has chosen to em-
brace consumer welfare, the present analysis explains the Court's re-
luctance to speak plainly about its normative premises in other 
doctrinal contexts, as well as its continued adherence to certain prece-
dents premised upon trader freedom.147 Some such precedents, after 
all, involve little or no obvious cost to consumers, at least as economic 
theory now stands. Even if economic theory demonstrates that these 
decisions bar only innocuous conduct, adherence to them entails few 
if any trade offs and correspondingly minor illegitimacy costs, while 
repudiation of them would require the Court to question directly its 
prior normative vision. 
The Court's stubborn adherence to the per se rule against tying 
agreements provides an example of this phenomenon.148 Although 
premised upon a concern for trader freedom, the prohibition of con-
tracts "forcing" a buyer to purchase (unwanted) tied products inflicts 
no obvious harm on consumers, at least when analyzed ·with the eco-
nomic models applied by the Court.149 These models simply demon-
strate that such contracts are not always harmful; they do not 
144 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing debate between "trader 
freedom" and "consumer welfare" schools). 
146 See Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 714 (suggesting that such a consensus cannot be 
reached). 
14 7 See supra notes 35-42 (describing the Court's refusal to abandon various precedents 
premised upon a concern for trader freedom). 
148 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-79 (1992) 
(appiyingper serule to tying arrangements);Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (rejecting challenge to per se rule). 
149 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-15 (holding that proof that seller imposing tie 
possesses market power establishes that tie has been "forced" on consumers and is per se 
illegal). 
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demonstrate that tying contracts usually or sometimes benefit con-
sumers.150 Adherence to this precedent, then, involves no apparent 
balancing of traders against consumers and thus no illegitimacy costs. 
Rejection of it, on the other hand, would seem political. 
This Essay's analysis suggests that this pattern is likely to continue. 
That is, the Court's adherence to precedents premised on trader free-
dom will vary inversely with the illegitimacy costs that such adherence 
will entail. The Court will continue to narrow or overrule those prece-
dents that would require the Court to sacrifice obvious benefits to 
consumers. It seems unlikely, however, that the Court, in the course 
of overruling these decisions, will speak directly to their normative 
premises. More plausibly, one would expect the Court to follow the 
course taken in Khan and assert that the economic premises underly-
ing prior decisions have proven false.151 For instance, one might ex-
pect the Court to abandon the per se rule against horizontal maximum 
price fixing152 without questioning the law's commitment to trader 
freedom. Similarly, the Court could relax precedents hostile to con-
sumer-friendly mergers by relying upon the greater appreciation in 
the economics profession and elsewhere of the beneficial effects of 
such transactions.153 
The Court will not, however, entirely expunge trader freedom 
from the case law. As noted above, some precedents that rest on this 
value present no obvious harm to cQnsumers. Take, for example, the 
law regarding group boycotts. Those who see no place for trader free-
dom in antitrust law would require a showing of economic harm 
before condemning such arrangements.154 Current law, however, for-
bids such boycotts when they are imposed by firms with market power 
and unaccompanied by any integration.155 Unlike a per se rule against 
maximum rpm, the per se rule against certain group boycotts does no 
150 See Meese, supra note 9, at 44-49 (contending that the dominant critique of tying 
doctrine depends upon the assertion that such contracts are rarely harmful, without any 
corresponding showing that they produce consumer benefits); see also id. at 48-49 (showing 
that briefs before the Court in Jefferson Parish barely mentioned the possible benefits of 
tying contracts). 
151 Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-30 
(1993) (narrowing Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), in light of 
revised understandings of the feasibility of predatory pricing). 
152 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982). 
153 For instance, the Court could agree with those lower courts that have suggested 
that efficiencies will justify an othenvise anticompetitive merger. See, e.g., FTC v. University 
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-23 (lith Cir. 1991); see also Williamson, supra note 56, at 
272-73 (describing increased appreciation in the economics profession for the benefits of 
mergers). 
154 See, e.g., RICHARD A PosNER, ANTITRuST LAw: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECUVE 207-11 
(1976). 
155 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
u.s. 284, 298 (1985). 
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apparent harm to consumers. As a result, adherence to a per se rule 
would involve no balancing of consumers against traders and thus en-
tail no illegitimacy costs. Therefore, the analysis offered here would 
predict that the Court would adhere to the current rule, even though 
it forbids conduct that is unlikely to result in economic harm.156 
Friends and foes of trader freedom will surely find the prognosis 
this Essay has offered disheartening. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that the state of affairs it has described is not permanent. For 
instance, to the extent that advocates can highlight for the Court just 
how precedents that protect traders harm consumers, they effectively 
can raise the illegitimacy costs of adhering to such decisions.157 
Also, as noted earlier, the Court's current reluctance to espouse a 
clear, consistent position regarding the role of trader freedom reflects 
its unwillingness to engage in conduct that may appear political.158 If 
all or nearly all of the scholars and lawyers concemed with antitrust 
shared a particular account of the original meaning of the Sherman 
Act, the Court explicitly could embrace or repudiate trader free-
dom.I59 However, no such uniformity of vision exists, and this lack of 
consensus ensures that the Court will face the charge of acting in a 
political manner regardless of the normative vision it ultimately 
embraces. 
There is, it should be noted, a significant irony in the position in 
which the Court has placed itself. In attempting to minimize the ap-
pearance of politicized decision making, the Justices have abjured any 
unifying standard, such as consumer welfare, to inform antitrust doc-
trine. The result has been and apparently will be a jurisprudence that 
treats similar cases very differently. Consider, for instance, the plight 
of a franchisor that possesses market power. Under Khan, a franchisor 
can prohibit opportunistic price gouging by its dealers through a 
price ceiling agreement, subject only to Rule of Reason scrutiny.16° 
However, the same franchisor cannot employ tying contracts to pre-
156 Of course, the fact that an agreement does not have anticompetitive effects sug-
gests that it produces efficiencies that benefit consumers and others. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. 
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); 1 AREEDA & 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 33, ~ 111, at 113 ("[E]fficiency gains are a probable explanation 
for conduct that promises no gain from reduced competition."). The mere fact that a 
contract produces such benefits, however, does guarantee that the benefits will be appar-
ent, or that the courts will recognize them as such. Absent such recognition, courts that 
adhere to rules voiding such agreements will suffer no illegitimacy costs. 
157 Thus, convincing the Court that, for example, tying contracts can yield significant 
consumer benefits may induce it to abandon the per se rule against such agreements. See 
Meese, supra note 9, at 59-66 (describing benefits of tying contracts). 
158 See supra Part IV .A. 
159 See Bork, supra note 28, at 173 (suggesting that, in deciding antitrust cases, the 
Court "must pay attention to its constituencies"). 
160 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing how maximum rpm can 
deter dealer opportunism). 
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vent opportunistic reductions in quality.161 Similarly, manufacturers 
can freely combat dealer free riding by granting and enforcing air-
tight exclusive territories.l62 Yet, should a manufacturer allow several 
dealers to exploit the same territory and set minimum prices to pre-
vent free riding, it may find itself paying treble damages or facing in-
dictment.163 By avoiding the appearance of politicized decision 
making on a case-by-case basis, the Justices have developed a jurispru-
dence that, taken as a whole, simply does not treat like cases alike. 
Faced with the choice between doctrinal consistency and the enhance-
ment of its own stature, the Court has chosen the latter course. 
CoNCLUSION 
Economics can and should play an important role in the develop-
ment of antitrust doctrine. Whether it should play an exclusive role 
poses a much more difficult question, on which there is no consensus 
in sight. So long as the protection of traders appears to injure con-
sumers, the Justices will neglect the value of trader freedom in favor of 
consumer-friendly decisions. However, when the Justices can preserve 
trader freedom without apparent consumer harm, decisions premised 
upon the protection of this value likely will survive. Legitimacy in ju-
dicial decision making, it seems, will come at the price of doctrinal 
incoherence. 
161 See jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (holding 
tying contracts obtained by firms with market power per se unlawful); Alan J. Meese, Anti-
trust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MicH. L. 
REv. 111, 117-121 (1996) (describing how tying contracts can prevent franchisee opportu-
nism). See generaUy Arthur, supra note 104, at 64-68 (describing similarities between tying 
and other intrabrand vertical restraints). 
162 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (stating 
that exclusive territories should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); supra notes 116-17 
and accompanying text (describing Rule of Reason case law sympathetic to exclusive 
territories). 
163 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-27 (1988) (reiter-
ating the per se rule against minimum rpm); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (rejecting asser-
tion that rationale for overruling Schwinn also required repudiation of per se rule against 
minimum rpm). 
